Michigan Law Review
Volume 94

Issue 6

1996

Words That Bind: Judicial Review and the Grounds of Modern
Constitutional Theory
John A. Drennan
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Law and Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
John A. Drennan, Words That Bind: Judicial Review and the Grounds of Modern Constitutional Theory, 94
MICH. L. REV. 1510 (1996).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol94/iss6/8

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

WORDS THAT BIND: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE GROUNDS OF
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY. By John Arthur. Boulder:
Westview Press. 1995. Pp. viii, 236. Cloth, $77.50; paper $23.50.
For some time now, discussions of judicial review and constitutional interpretation have been held hostage to partisan political
debate. On the one hand, political conservatives urge judges to
stick to the so-called "original intentions" of the Constitution's authors when making constitutional decisions. On the other hand,
political liberals challenge judges to peer behind the words and to
engage the "spirit of the Constitution." It would be difficult to
overstate the stakes of the debate. Unfortunately, however, it often
seems that no one knows what these phrases mean or what their
concrete implications for constitutional interpretation are.
John Arthur's Words that Bind1 takes a valuable step toward
clarifying our understanding of judicial review. Arthur discusses judicial review as a topic in its own right, independent of result-driven
politics, and asks what can be said for and against various prominent theories of constitutional interpretation. Consequently, Words
that Bind is an excellent place to begin piecing together the abstract, complex issues involved in judicial review. The book will be
especially useful for readers with an undergraduate-level background in modern analytic philosophy.
At 236 pages, Words that Bind is a relatively short work. Nevertheless, its scope is comprehensive. In successive chapters Arthur
covers theories of original intent, proceduralism, the critical legal
studies movement, Utilitarianism - including a discussion of the
law and economics school - and contractualism. The book is well
written and the philosophical concepts involved are clearly
explained.
There is more to Words that Bind than can be covered in this
review. Arthur's book is primarily a work of legal philosophy; thus,
I confine myself to addressing the philosophical issues he raises. It
should be noted, however, that Words that Bind contains much that
would be of interest to the intellectual historian, and this review
ignores the book's historical content.
Arthur makes short work of his first target - constitutional
originalism. Constitutional originalists make some version of the
familiar claim that when a dispute arises about the meaning of a
constitutional provision, it should be interpreted as the Framers
1. John Arthur is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Program in Philosophy,
Politics, and Law at Binghamton University.

1510

May 1996]

Judicial Review

1511

originally intended it to be interpreted.2 For example, if the Framers regarded thumb screws, but not executions, as cruel and unusual
punishment, then the Eight Amendment should be read to prevent
the states or Congress from imposing the former but not the latter
form of punishment. Originalists tend to be moral skeptics who put
great stock in majority rule. In particular, originalists seek to prevent judges from imposing their subjective preferences and values
on the majority. Originalists also tend to see the Constitution as a
kind of contract or covenant among the people; they believe the
role of the judge is to enforce the terms of the contract on behalf of
the people. Judges act consistently with the ideal of democratic
governance when they stick closely to the Constitution's text, tie
their decisions to history, and refrain from creating new rights. In
other words, judges should decide disputes in accordance with the
terms of the agreed-upon constitutional contract, not replace that
contract with something they happen to think preferable.
Arthur catalogs originalism's well-known woes (pp. 7-43), and
in so doing makes a convincing case against it. For instance, if the
Constitution is a contract, in what sense can we be, said to have
consented to it? Certainly most of us have not expressly accepted
its terms. If we somehow tacitly consent to the constitutional contract, what is the relationship between our tacit consent and original
intent? Most of us are in no position to answer the historical question of what was in the minds of the Framers at the time of the
Constitution's ratification.3 Even historians cannot agree about
such matters. How can we be said to have consented to the specifics of the Framers's original intentions, then, when most of us have
at best a very general, hazy idea of what those intentions might
have been?
Even if we can be said to have consented to the Framer's original intent, it is far from clear that originalism can provide judges
with a coherent definition of the phrase "original intent.'' Accordingly, it is far from clear that originalists can provide judges with a
clear set of instructions for actually deciding cases. For example,
judges need to know who should be counted among the Framers in
order to determine their original intentions. The Framers, however,
could be the actual constitutional drafters, everyone attending the
constitutional convention, or all those who ratified the Constitution.
Another problem arises when one attempts to discover a univocal "intention" of any of these groups of "Framers." Even if the
2. For a useful discussion of the loosely related ways in which originalists have characterized their theories, see GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND TIIE CONSTITUTION 1737 (1992).
3. For an interesting historical perspective on the actual intentions of the Constitution's
Framers, see generally JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: Pouncs AND IDEAS IN TIIE
MAKING OF TIIE CoNSIITUTION (1996).

1512

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 94:1510

"original intent" behind a constitutional clause is identified with
whatever the majority of the Framers would have said its meaning
was, there is simply no reason to believe a "group intention" must
exist for any clause. People can vote for the same provision for
sharply divergent reasons. Thus, absent some reason to think that
the group defined as the Framers had a majority position concerning the meaning of each disputed clause of the Constitution,
originalism may have trouble getting off the ground.
Arthur moves on to a second, and initially more promising, theory of judicial review - democratic proceduralism (pp. 45-73).
Like originalism, proceduralism places heavy emphasis on the value
of majority rule and the need to hold in check judges who, if unconstrained, would impose their personal values on others.
Proceduralism parts company with originalism at the suggestion
that the Constitution should be read as a contract, the terms of
which we can fairly be said to have accepted. According to the
proceduralist, the role of judge is not to enforce a contract, but
rather to ensure that the democratic process has worked properly.
Proceduralists start with the assumption that democratic political
processes are self-legitimating; thus, whatever laws ultimately
emerge from fair and open democratic elections are necessarily just
laws. No matter what a judge thinks of the wisdom of a given piece
of legislation, the law cannot be rejected on constitutional grounds
if it is the result of a genuinely democratic process. Put another
way, democratic proceduralists sees constitutional interpretation as
an exercise in what John Rawls called "pure procedural justice."4
Arthur's main complaint against proceduralism is its inability to
protect minority interests from tyranny by the majority (pp. 62-68).
Suppose a duly elected legislature passes laws undermining certain
fundamental rights of a despised minority. The government takes
care, however, not to undermine the democratic processes in which
the minority members may participate. For example, the majority
preserves the rights of minority members to vote, hold political office, and exercise freedom of speech. The fundamental problem for
proceduralism is that as long as this hypothetical situation is the
result of a regular, open, and fair election process, there is little the
proceduralist can say to condemn it.
Proceduralists may attempt to blunt the criticism by appealing
to the constitutional doctrine of strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. At least when it impacts certain groups, burdensome legislation will be carefully scrutinized to make sure that it is
necessary for achieving a compelling state interest. Thus, our legal
system provides some built-in protection against the kind of legislation in question.
4.

JOHN

RAWLS, A THEORY

OF JUSTICE

85-86 (1971).
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Arthur argues that appealing to strict scrutiny in this context
undermines the proceduralist's view of judges as neutral parties
who refrain from imposing their personal views on others (pp. 6668). Consider the example of a judge asked to decide whether a
state's anti-sodomy law burdening homosexuals violates equal protection.5 The judge must first determine if homosexuals are a discrete and insular minority. Arthur argues that this determination
cannot be made independently of the judge's personal view of homosexuality (p. 67). ~omosexuals will seem prejudiced and strict
scrutiny triggered if the judge believes that there is nothing wrong
with homosexual acts between consenting adults. If, on the other
hand, the judge believes that homosexual acts are an illegitimate
form of sexual expression, laws against such acts will not seem to be
the result of mere prejudice and the judge will not invoke strict
scrutiny. Arthur's example suggests that proceduralism will not be
able to honor its commitment to judicial neutrality without a significant revision of current constitutional law.
Arthur explores some of the ways in which proceduralists might
try to overcome their inability to protect the fundamental interests
of minorities (pp. 68-74). For example, the proceduralist might insist that all citizens be granted an equal opportunity to influence the
political process, thus enabling the proceduralist to challenge discriminatory laws on the basis of their inevitably negative impact on
access to the political process (pp. 71-72). But whatever success the
proceduralist can expect to have with such a move, an underlying
problem remains: proceduralism focuses on the wrong thing. The
failings of discriminatory laws are not limited merely to their adverse effects on the political process. Violations of minority rights
would be objectionable even if the violations did not affect the
political process. Proceduralism fails to give us a way to capture
this point.
Arthur's treatment of the critical legal studies (CLS) movement
in his third chapter may strike the reader as a bit idiosyncratic.
While it is difficult to give a nutshell version of CLS, CLS proponents tend to see the rule of law as illusory. Statutes and case law
do not constrain judges in any meaningful sense; judges are free to
reach whatever decisions they like on almost any basis they like. In
a phrase, the law is "indeterminate." Legal Realists made similar
claims years ago. 6 Unlike Legal Realism, however, CLS does not
use the personalities and individual traits of particular judges to explain legal decisions. Instead CLS stresses the political and ideolog5. Due process concerns with such a law were presumably settled in Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 {1986) {finding no due process violation).
6. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism - Responding to Dean
Pound, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1222 {1931).
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ical tensions at work in the law. As a result, CLS adherents tend to
view judicial review in starkly political and pragmatic terms - judicial review is a tool for social change; judges should acknowledge
their nearly unfettered decisionmaking power and then use that
power to fashion a better world (p. 81 ).
CLS must contend with a crucial question: Why do its proponents think that the law is indeterminate? Arthur suggests the answer is that CLS is really a form of moral skepticism (pp. 86-88). In
particular, CLS proponents do not believe that legal, conventional,
or human rights exist. They believe that talk about political rights is
merely an expression of personal, subjective preferences on the part
of the speaker. Th.ere can be no correct answers in disputes about
rights, much as there can be no correct answers when children debate whether vanilla is a better flavor than chocolate. Thus, legal
decisions balancing one - nonexistent - right against another are
no more than unconstrained acts of judicial will in thin disguise.
Arthur's answer to all of this is relatively straightforward. Using
the action of an ideal observer as a foil, he points out that noncognitivist moral philosophers long ago developed a variety of ways that
allow us to provide correctness conditions for statements that are at
bottom nothing more than expressions of a speaker's attitudes.7
Thus, even if one were to grant that rights discourse is essentially a
subjective matter, it would be fallacious to infer that any notion of
correctness is therefore inapplicable to rights talk. Statements concerning rights are meaningful according to the noncognitivist, it is
just that the conditions under which those statements are correctly
assertable are not what moral realists would take them to be. In
other words, if CLS is trading on the idea that no statement about
the existence or applicability of a legal right can be correct because
such statements simply express the preferences of judges and advocates, then CLS has gone too far.
Arthur's diagnosis of CLS's ills is not compelling. The
noncognitivist strategies he describes are so old hat at this point
that one has to wonder if a raw, unsophisticated moral skepticism
could really be what drives the CLS movement. Surely at least
some CLS proponents have absorbed the noncognitivist lessons
contained in almost any decent introductory ethics textbook published in the last thirty years.8 If Arthur is correct, then the very
existence of CLS can be neatly explained by the amusing thought
that CLS's guiding lights failed to pay attention in their college eth7. By the "correctness conditions" of a statement, I mean simply those conditions that
would have to obtain for the statement to be correctly assertable.
8. See, e.g., RICHARD B. BRANDT, EnnCAL THEORY 211-14 (1959). For an up-to-date
discussion of noncognitivism and the notions of correctness, truth, and objectivity, see Stephen Darwell et al., Toward Fin de si~cle Ethics: Some Trends, 101 PHIL. REv. 115, 144-52
(1992).
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ics courses. I submit that there is more to CLS than Arthur allows,
although I will be the first to admit that I am not entirely certain
what more there is.
Chapter Four contains a lengthy discussion of utilitarianism and
its application to judicial review. Utilitarianism is a theory of the
right. In particular, utilitarians believe that to determine what the
morally right act is in a given situation, one ranks possible states of
affairs by their levels of utility; the right act is the act that brings
about the highest ranked state of affairs. What "utility" refers to is
a heavily debated issue among utilitarians. Arthur argues that utility is best understood as experiences that are desirable, rather than
those that satisfy desires or promote economic efficiency, definitions used by law and economics scholars.
Arthur employs rule utilitarianism to explore the notion of judicial review from the utilitarian's perspective. A utilitarian might
argue that instead of looking directly at the consequences of individual acts, judges should seek to make their decisions in accordance with the rule that would maximize utility if followed generally.
Utilitarian judges would normally follow past legal precedent because of the need to maintain the institutional integrity of the judicial system in combination with the fact that judges will recognize
their relatively limited abilities to evaluate the ultimate consequences of a given rule. In certain clear cases utilitarian judges will
put these scruples aside and overturn laws that obviously burden
the general welfare, but such cases are likely to be rarities.
Utilitarianism's Achilles' heel, argues Arthur, is what it leaves
out of its account of moral and judicial reasoning (pp. 140-43). Is
torture cruel and unusual punishment according to the utilitarian?
Let's say that it can be proven that widely televised torture has a
terrifically strong deterrent effect and that society would experience
a net gain in utility by publicly torturing its criminals. Utilitarians
would then agree that such torture is an appropriate form of punishment because it maximizes welfare. This analysis, however,
leaves something out, viz., many people share the intuition that it
would be wrong to torture criminals whatever the utility calculations show. Torture is an affront to human dignity. Human dignity
may not be the dispositive consideration in deciding whether our
society should employ torture, but that is not the point. The point
is that it is a consideration and it is a consideration ignored by the
utilitarian calculus. The best that the utilitarian can do is to treat
the desire to preserve human dignity as one more desire to be
weighed against all other desires. Thus the utilitarian is not in a
position to account for typical intuitions about the importance of
human dignity. Of course, the utilitarian is free to deny the moral
significance of dignity. But for those of us who wish to treat moral
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intuitions as data to be explained by a moral theory, rather than
explained away, utilitarianism is not a satisfying normative basis for
an account of judicial review.
Arthur's final chapter reveals his sympathies for democratic
contractualism. Arthur recommends contractualism as a way to account for what utilitarianism could not account for, namely, the intrinsic value of certain fundamental rights. Under Arthur's version
of contractualism, we are to think of the Constitution as akin to a
Rawlsian social contract (p. 155). A social contract is justified if it
would be agreed to by people communally deciding how to structure a society but who are ignorant of all the factors that distinguish
them as individuals. In other words, a distribution of wealth and
rights is legitimate just in case it would be chosen from Rawls's
"original position."
Unfortunately, Arthur does not clearly state how contractualism
relates to judicial review. For one thing, it is entirely implausible to
think that the United States Constitution is rooted in contractualism. It strains credulity to think that the members of the constitutional convention were ignoring the fact that they were white, male
property owners. The political circumstances surrounding subsequent amendments of the Constitution do not approximate the
ideal of Rawls's original position to any greater degree.
Furthermore, even if one were to believe that the Constitution
is a product of contractualist philosophy, contractualism says very
little about how the Constitution should be interpreted. Arthur
considers capital punishment and the right to privacy from the contractualist standpoint, but his contractualist vision offers no unique
insight into these topics. Consequently, contractualism's powers to
help solve the dilemmas of judicial review seem quite limited. Contractualism may be an interesting moral theory, but it leaves much
to be desired as either a descriptive or prescriptive theory of judicial review in our legal system.
Although Words that Bind occasionally lapses and becomes too
vague to be informative, the book's strengths overcome its weaknesses. For the most part, it is clear, scholarly, and well written.
Anyone interested in the foundations of judicial review and who
has a basic background in modem philosophy can find something
worthwhile in this book.
-

John A. Drennan

